152	DISARMAMENT AND SECWJTY	F>artii
to a fresh disturbance which would do an injury to the whole, nation....
Any attempt to sabotage the German Revolution, particularly by un-
authorized interference in business and industry, . . . must therefore be
punished by the severest measures.
Within less than twelve months of the publication of this passage,
the Fuhrer was to prove himself as good as his word. A further order,
deprecating, an excess of xeal in the Nazi ranks and speaking in
eighteenth-century accents that came oddly from "Hitlorian lips,
was issued on the 3rd November.
If Herr Hitler's claim to have received a positive mandate was to
be admitted, it was a mandate to perform both of two Herculean
tasks: the conquest of unemployment at home and the restoration
of Germany's status abroad to a footing of equality with the other
Great Powers of the World, In grappling with these practical tasks,
Herr Hitler was working against time; and he had to fear that, if he
were eventually counted out, his would-be judges and executioners
would step forth from the ranks of his own present followers.
(d) the reactions abroad to thm revolution in gkkmany
1. Introductory Note,
A revolution which changed the face of Germany within six
months evoked abroad the liveliest feelings of indignation, em-
barrassment and apprehension; and these emotions—excited in
different countries in different combinations and degrees, and playing
upon an intricate and ever shifting system of international relations—
produced widespread and profound international effects.
There were few countries in the World in which the portent of
Herr Hitler's advent to power in Berlin on the 30th January, 1933,
did not make some impression; and these impressions can be ranged
in a certain order on the psychological scale. At one extreme of the
gamut we may place the reaction—displaying a maximum of in-
dignation and a minimum of fear—which was evoked in the United
States; at the opposite extreme, the reaction in Russia, whore the
indignation at the ruthless suppression of the Russian Communists'
German comrades by the victorious Nazis was overshadowed by an
acute fear for the safety of the Soviet Union itself. This fear in the
minds of the Soviet statesmen in Moscow proved—in combination
with their previously awakened fear of Japan—to be so powerful a
political driving-force that, within eighteen months of Herr Hitler's
accession to power, it had produced a sensational reversal of the
established foreign policy of the Soviet Government: a reversal